CSTR 工控安全虚实融合仿真方法研究

doi:10.11949/0438-1157.20250418

化工学报 ›› 2025, Vol. 76 ›› Issue (9): 4524-4538.DOI: 10.11949/0438-1157.20250418

• 专栏：过程模拟与仿真 • 上一篇下一篇

CSTR 工控安全虚实融合仿真方法研究

何广汇¹^,³(), 王金江¹^,³(), 魏振强²^,³, 汪征¹^,³, 张来斌¹^,³

^1.中国石油大学（北京）安全与海洋工程学院，北京 102249
^2.中国石油集团安全环保技术研究院，北京 102206
^3.国家市场监督管理总局油气生产装备质量检测与健康诊断重点实验室，北京 102249

收稿日期:2025-04-18 修回日期:2025-06-04 出版日期:2025-09-25 发布日期:2025-10-23
通讯作者: 王金江
作者简介:何广汇（2002—），男，硕士研究生，1904580629@qq.com
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划项目(2023YFB3107700);国家自然科学基金重点项目(52234007);中国石油集团安全环保技术研究院项目(2023DJ6508)

Research on CSTR industrial control security virtual reality fusion simulation method

Guanghui HE¹^,³(), Jinjiang WANG¹^,³(), Zhenqiang WEI²^,³, Zheng WANG¹^,³, Laibin ZHANG¹^,³

^1.School of Safety and Ocean Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China
^2.China Petroleum Group Safety and Environmental Protection Technology Research Institute, Beijing 102206, China
^3.Key Laboratory of Oil and Gas Production Equipment Quality Inspection and Health Diagnosis, State Administration for Market Regulation, Beijing 102249, China

Received:2025-04-18 Revised:2025-06-04 Online:2025-09-25 Published:2025-10-23
Contact: Jinjiang WANG

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

随着化工行业朝着智能化方向发展，化工反应系统频繁遭受网络攻击，产生了严重的后果。现有工控安全仿真研究大多单独在网络领域进行，缺少针对化工反应系统的工控安全仿真技术。因此，针对该问题，以化工反应系统中常见的连续搅拌式反应釜（continuous stirred tank reactor，CSTR）为研究对象，提出一种针对CSTR的工控安全虚实融合仿真技术。首先建立CSTR控制系统模型，提出了基于攻击类型分析、攻击仿真方法、响应分析方法与攻击监测和控制方法的工控安全虚实融合仿真技术框架，利用CSTR工控安全仿真平台，实现了针对CSTR系统的攻击模拟和响应分析，并验证了提出的针对网络攻击的监测和控制方法，为推动网络安全在化工领域内的研究提供了借鉴。

关键词: CSTR, 网络攻击, 虚实融合仿真方法, 工控安全仿真平台

Abstract:

As the chemical industry develops towards intelligence, chemical reaction systems are frequently attacked by network attacks, resulting in serious consequences. Most of the existing industrial control security simulation research is conducted independently in the field of networks, lacking industrial control security simulation technology for chemical reaction systems. Therefore, in response to this issue, a simulation technology for industrial control safety virtual real fusion of continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR), which is commonly used in chemical reaction systems, is proposed. Firstly, a CSTR control system model was established, and an industrial control security virtual real fusion simulation technology framework based on attack type analysis, attack simulation method, response analysis method, and attack monitoring and control method was proposed. Using the CSTR industrial control security simulation platform, attack simulation and response analysis for the CSTR system were implemented, and the proposed monitoring and control method for network attacks was verified, providing reference for promoting research on network security in the chemical industry.

Key words: CSTR, network attack, virtual real fusion simulation method, industrial control security simulation platform

中图分类号:

TQ 015.9

何广汇, 王金江, 魏振强, 汪征, 张来斌. CSTR 工控安全虚实融合仿真方法研究[J]. 化工学报, 2025, 76(9): 4524-4538.

Guanghui HE, Jinjiang WANG, Zhenqiang WEI, Zheng WANG, Laibin ZHANG. Research on CSTR industrial control security virtual reality fusion simulation method[J]. CIESC Journal, 2025, 76(9): 4524-4538.

图/表 10

图1 CSTR控制系统模型

Fig.1 The control system model of CSTR

图2 工控安全仿真技术框架

Fig.2 Industrial control security simulation technology framework

表1 针对CSTR系统的攻击形式

Table 1 Attack forms against CSTR system

攻击形式	攻击手段	后果
传感器上的虚假数据注入攻击	篡改系统中的反应釜温度或物料流量等传感器数据	通过传感器获得的系统基本状态错误
恶意指令注入攻击	伪造控制中心的指令，修改正常系统过程状态	设定的系统过程状态与正常状态之间存在偏差
执行器上的虚假数据注入攻击	篡改控制系统中执行器的输出的夹套冷却液流量	控制系统实际输出的冷却液流量错误
拒绝服务攻击	破坏控制回路的数据传输和交流能力	控制系统的输出停止，处于瘫痪状态

表2 不同类型网络攻击的仿真形式

Table 2 Simulation forms of different types of network attacks

攻击类型	仿真形式
传感器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 1 (t) = U 1 (t) + V 1 (t)$
恶意指令注入攻击	$U ˜ 2 (t) = U 2 (t) + V 2 (t)$
执行上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 3 (t) = U 3 (t) + V 3 (t)$
拒绝服务攻击	$U ˜ 4 (t) = 0$

表2 不同类型网络攻击的仿真形式

Table 2 Simulation forms of different types of network attacks

攻击类型	仿真形式
传感器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 1 (t) = U 1 (t) + V 1 (t)$
恶意指令注入攻击	$U ˜ 2 (t) = U 2 (t) + V 2 (t)$
执行上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 3 (t) = U 3 (t) + V 3 (t)$
拒绝服务攻击	$U ˜ 4 (t) = 0$

图3 攻击者和控制系统间的相互作用过程

Fig.3 The interaction process between attackers and control systems

图4 CSTR工控安全仿真平台

Fig.4 CSTR industrial control security simulation platform

表3 仿真相关的变量和参数

Table 3 Simulation related variables and parameters

变量	初值	平衡值	范围
$C A f$ /（ $k m o l / m 3$ ）	10	10	—
$T f$ / $K$	300	300	N (300,1)
$F c$ /（ $m 3 / h$ ）	6	4.4	[3.7,5.2]
$F$ /（ $m 3 / h$ ）	2	1	[0,10]
$T$ / $K$	311	373	[310,390]

表3 仿真相关的变量和参数

Table 3 Simulation related variables and parameters

变量	初值	平衡值	范围
$C A f$ /（ $k m o l / m 3$ ）	10	10	—
$T f$ / $K$	300	300	N (300,1)
$F c$ /（ $m 3 / h$ ）	6	4.4	[3.7,5.2]
$F$ /（ $m 3 / h$ ）	2	1	[0,10]
$T$ / $K$	311	373	[310,390]

图5 恶意指令注入攻击的PC端仿真模型

Fig.5 The PC simulation model for malicious instruction injection attacks

表4 攻击仿真方案

Table 4 Attack simulation scheme

攻击类型	仿真形式
传感器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 1 (t) = U 1 (t) + 0.005 t$
恶意指令注入攻击	$U ˜ 2 (t) = U 2 (t) - 0.5$
执行器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 3 (t) = U 3 (t) - 0.15 t$
拒绝服务攻击	$U ˜ 4 (t) = 0$

表4 攻击仿真方案

Table 4 Attack simulation scheme

攻击类型	仿真形式
传感器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 1 (t) = U 1 (t) + 0.005 t$
恶意指令注入攻击	$U ˜ 2 (t) = U 2 (t) - 0.5$
执行器上的虚假数据注入攻击	$U ˜ 3 (t) = U 3 (t) - 0.15 t$
拒绝服务攻击	$U ˜ 4 (t) = 0$

图10 攻击监测界面

Fig.10 Attack monitoring interface

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CSTR 工控安全虚实融合仿真方法研究

Research on CSTR industrial control security virtual reality fusion simulation method

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